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ABSTRACT 
Our economic and social welfare depend on certain “critical” infrastructures and key 
resources.  Protecting these infrastructures is a challenge because they are complex, and 
as systems they are difficult to understand, predict and control.  In addition, they do not 
operate in isolation, but are interdependent with other infrastructures.  This presents a 
challenge for their modeling and analysis.  Due to the complexity of modeling the 
operation of just a single infrastructure, most research to date has analyzed infrastructures 
in isolation.  This thesis introduces a taxonomy of dependence relationships and 
incorporates these relationships into an attacker-defender model of interdependent 
infrastructure operation.  We formulate and solve a sequence of models to illustrate how 
dependence relationships between infrastructures create vulnerabilities that are not 
apparent in single-infrastructure models, and we use the results to assess the 
consequences of disruptions to a system of infrastructures.  We provide complete 
documentation for how to apply these techniques to real infrastructure problems and 
include a discussion of the necessary assumptions, as well as the pros and cons of our 
methods.  Finally, we present examples of how to provide relevant, understandable 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Our economic and social welfare depend on certain “critical” infrastructures and key 
resources, such as energy, communication, and transportation systems.  None of our 
nation’s critical infrastructures operates in isolation.  Each relies on inputs from other 
infrastructures to operate as intended, whether in the form of commodities, services, or 
information.  These dependence relationships create potential vulnerabilities that are 
often not apparent until infrastructures are disrupted by accidents, failures, natural 
disasters, or deliberate attacks. 
Because our nation cannot protect our critical infrastructures from all threats, we 
must assess their “resilience” in the face of disruption.  Techniques for modeling 
infrastructure resilience vary, from risk-assessment models to “operational models” that 
attempt to capture component-level operational details and interactions.  A natural 
starting point for assessing infrastructure resilience is to model each infrastructure in 
isolation.  Modeling infrastructures individually allows us to accurately capture 
operational-level details appropriate to the particular type of system, and has encouraged 
the development of specific modeling techniques suited for the infrastructure at hand.  
An attacker-defender (AD) model is a game-theoretic, operational model that 
assesses the worst-case disruption for an infrastructure operator by assuming component 
losses are selected by an intelligent attacker with perfect information.  AD has been 
successfully applied to more than 150 case studies of individual infrastructures or 
military decision problems.   However, in all cases, these analyses make the implicit 
assumption that any other supporting infrastructures are available and invulnerable to 
attack.  This can result in inaccurate assessments of network resilience that provide 
operators with a false sense of security.  
This thesis extends the standard attacker-defender model of a single infrastructure 
to account for the interdependence of two or more infrastructure systems.  We present a 
general formulation for assessing resilience of a collection of independent infrastructures.  
We define a direct, cost-based dependence and introduce a model to examine such 
 xiv 
relationships (e.g., geographic dependence).  Finally, we define six indirect component-
level dependence relationships:  single-input, exclusive-or, shared, substitute, 
complimentary and mutual, and present a final formulation to assess the resilience of a 
collection of infrastructures containing both direct and indirect dependence relationships.  
We present an algorithm based on Benders decomposition to solve this formulation in an 
efficient manner. 
To demonstrate our technique, we formulate and solve a sequence of simple 
network flow models and present the worst-case attacks and resulting operator flows for 
different levels of attacker resources.  We show that disruptions are more costly when 
infrastructures are interdependent, and the presence of these dependence relationships 
favors the attacker.  We show that locally optimal decisions of a single operator do not 
always lead to globally optimal behavior within a collection of interdependent 
infrastructures, necessitating the need for a decision maker to coordinate such activities at 
the global level.  
We provide our formulations as a means of representing component-level 
dependence relationships in order to uncover resulting vulnerabilities and more 
accurately assess resilience for collections of infrastructures.  Although we use minimum-
cost network flow models in this thesis for ease of illustration, our main contribution does 
not depend on a network structure for the models used to represent the individual 
infrastructures.  Natural extensions of our formulation include modeling of dependence 
classes other than physical, such as logical or cyber, along with the implementation of a 
tri-level (Defender-Attacker-Defender) model to identify an optimal defensive plan for 
the collection of infrastructures. 
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I. INTERDEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The September 11, 2001, attacks by Al Qaeda on the World Trade Center caused 
over 240 disruptions across eight infrastructures within Manhattan, including over 50 
identified as resulting from interdependence relationships (Wallace, Mendonca, Lee, 
Mitchell, & Chow, 2003).   When considered in concert with the successful attack on the 
Pentagon and the failed attempt on the United States Capitol building on that day, these 
incidents had short-term effects on global financial markets and still impact worldwide 
air transportation today. 
Society’s economic and social welfare depend on certain “critical” infrastructures 
and key resources, such as energy, communication, and transportation systems.  The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) explicitly lists eighteen critical U.S. 
infrastructure and key resource (CI/KR) sectors vital to our nation’s security in the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (DHS, 2009).  In the 2007 National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, DHS recognizes it is not possible to deter all threats to our 
infrastructure; thus, the nation must mitigate vulnerabilities by “ensuring the structural 
and operational resilience” of CI/KR (p. 27).   The National Infrastructure Advisory 
Council (NIAC) defines resilience in the following manner: 
Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or 
duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure 
or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or 
rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event. (2009, p. 8)  
None of our nation’s critical infrastructures operates in isolation.  Each relies on 
inputs from other infrastructures to operate as intended, whether inputs in the form of 
commodities, services, or information.  Even when considered in isolation, these 
infrastructures can be complex and sizable when viewed at an operational level.  A 
regional power grid, for example, might contain thousands of power lines and buses, and 
hundreds of generators (Salmerón, Wood, & Baldick, 2009).  Infrastructures are also 
continually changing to meet new demands or exploit new technology.    Protecting our 
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infrastructures is a challenge because they are complex and difficult to understand, 
predict and control.  This presents a challenge for their modeling and analysis. 
Techniques for modeling critical infrastructure resilience vary, from risk 
assessment models to “operational models” that attempt to capture component-level 
operational details and interactions.  Because of the details required to capture the 
operation of just a single infrastructure, most researchers to date have modeled 
infrastructures in isolation. In a few cases, researchers have formulated models of 
collections of infrastructures and their interdependence relationships to assess 
vulnerabilities.  To the best of our knowledge, however, no one has modeled a collection 
of infrastructures with the level of fidelity necessary to assess operational resilience. 
B. RELATED WORK 
We first discuss a brief history of critical infrastructure protection and then 
introduce a baseline model of infrastructure operation in isolation.  We then summarize 
how others define, group and model interdependence relationships.  Finally, we present 
our contribution in context. 
1. Critical Infrastructure Protection 
In Critical Path: A Brief History of Critical Infrastructure Protection in the 
United States, Brown (2006) documents the rise of critical infrastructure in the United 
States from the earliest postal road networks in the late eighteenth century to present day. 
The basis for modern discussion on critical infrastructure originated as a result of late 
twentieth-century events, specifically the dramatic rise in terrorist activity against the 
United States in the early 1990s: the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the 
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1993, and a federal building in Oklahoma City in 
1995, for example.  Subsequently, President Clinton established the President’s 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) through Executive Order No. 
13010 (1996).  
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It is clear to us that infrastructure assurance must be a high priority for the 
nation in the Information Age. With escalating dependence on information 
and telecommunications, our infrastructures no longer enjoy the protection 
of oceans and military forces. They are vulnerable in new ways. We must 
protect them in new ways. (PCCIP, 1997b, p. 9) 
In its report Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures the 
PCCIP recognizes that the U.S. suffers an increasing dependence on critical infrastructure 
while systemic vulnerabilities grow, due to new cyber threats and increasing system 
complexities and interdependence relationships.  The report also recognizes a wide 
spectrum of threats, notes a deficient general awareness by the public, and expresses 
concern over a lack of a national focus.  As a result, the PCCIP concludes that the 
increasing threats in new domains require new thinking from both the public and private 
sectors, with immediate action needed to protect our future.  PCCIP’s recommendations 
include establishing a national organization to include CI/KR sector coordinators, 
agencies and government councils to bridge the gap between public and private sectors 
while enhancing information sharing and cooperation, revising outdated regulations to 
account for changes in technology; and changing research and development goals to 
counter current sector weaknesses (PCCIP, 1997b). 
The United States is exposed to escalating hazards present as a consequence of 
infrastructure interdependence brought about by both technology and the Internet 
(PCCIP, 1997a; Brown, 2006).  As our sophisticated networks increasingly depend on 
computers and Internet connections to automate many of their routine functions, 
infrastructure interdependence grows.  We often realize these interdependence 
relationships only when bad things happen.  A notable example is the Northeast Blackout 
of 2003, the worst in U.S. history.  A failure of several transmission lines in Ohio 
cascaded into power failures across the Northeast United States and Canada, leaving an 
estimated 50 million people without power (Davidson, 2008).  It also resulted in loss of 
water supply due to inadequate pumping, regional transportation outages due to rail and 
airline stoppages, and temporary interruption of cellular telephone service. 
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Whether threatened by human error, natural disaster, or terrorists, our nation’s 
critical infrastructures are at risk.  Their protection requires methods of identifying and 
modeling interdependence relationships, detecting vulnerabilities and placing defenses to 
protect the most critical assets. 
2. Operational versus Nonoperational Analysis 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes the need for “operational 
resilience” in our infrastructure systems (DHS 2007, p. 27).  What does this mean?  
According to the NIAC (2009), it is the ability of an infrastructure, when faced with 
disruptions, to adjust its activities and continue functioning (or quickly recover) to meet 
its objective. 
To assess operational resilience, we must model the function of the infrastructure.  
We cannot do this by representing only the various system components and assessing 
their individual vulnerabilities.  We need to represent how the various components work 
together to accomplish the infrastructure purpose, or objective (i.e., function).  We must 
be able to recognize how operations change as a result of infrastructure activity decisions.  
Decisions can follow rule sets (e.g., if component A fails, switch control to component 
B), but they often require us to evaluate tradeoffs that result from unexpected 
consequences after some disruption.  Thus, in order to assess infrastructure operational 
resilience, we must capture the component-level details and the interaction between the 
components as decisions are made.  We refer to a model that captures this level of fidelity 
as an operational model. 
We consider any model that does not capture the operation of an infrastructure to 
be non-operational. An example is the Integrated Risk Management Framework (IRMF) 
advocated by DHS in its National Infrastructure Protection Plan (DHS, 2009).  This 
framework assesses infrastructure resilience through risk analysis as a function of threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences.  It does not capture the operational details of 
infrastructure.  We prefer the more prescriptive nature of operational models and focus 
our discussion on these here. 
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3. Modeling Infrastructures in Isolation 
A natural starting point for assessing infrastructure resilience is to model each 
infrastructure in isolation.  Modeling infrastructures individually allows us to accurately 
capture operational-level details appropriate to the particular type of system.  This has 
encouraged the development of specific modeling techniques suited to the infrastructure 
at hand.  Regardless of technique used, the goal is to assess infrastructure performance in 
the presence of (possibly uncertain) disruption. 
a.   Single Scenario Performance Analysis 
The basis for our analysis is a mathematical formulation representing the 
operation of an infrastructure.  Brown, Carlyle, Salmerón and Wood (2005, 2006) 
catalogue various ways of representing infrastructure operation.  In many cases, a linear 
representation with an objective function based upon cost is sufficient to capture first-
order effects.   
Without loss of generality, an “operator” chooses a set of activities Y to 
minimize system operating cost, subject to specific infrastructure constraints and known, 
fixed disruptions–such as those caused by system component malfunctions, acts of 
nature, or known attacks.  The resulting model is 
min ( , ). (1.1)
Y
f Y X  
Here, X represents these known, fixed component-level disruptions.  A 
key assumption is that even with known disruptions, the operator will control his 
infrastructure, by choosing or rewarding actions Y, to minimize total cost.  By choosing 
an appropriate X  for any scenario of interest, we can conduct systematic “what-if” 
analyses.  The function f represents the total system operating cost. 
b. Expected Performance Analysis 
In many cases, it is appropriate to characterize the disruption or loss of 
system components using probabilities (e.g., a weather event or engineering failure).  
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Given a random variable X  representing the availability of system components, we can 
define the expected performance of the system as 
 ( )min ( , ) . (1.2)X YE f Y X   
Here, for any fixed realization X of the random variable X , the system 
operator chooses the best activities as in Equation (1.1).  We can evaluate this expectation 
(1.2) using traditional Monte Carlo techniques (Law & Kelton, 2000, pp. 90-91). 
c.   Worst-Case Performance Analysis 
When we assume disruptions are selected by an intelligent attacker with 
perfect information, the model becomes a two-stage, zero-sum game if we assume the 
attacker wishes to maximize what the operator seeks to minimize.  It is difficult to keep 
details of critical infrastructures hidden with absolute certainty, so assuming the attacker 
has the information he needs is conservative, but prudent, and it sets a worst-case for the 
operator, or “defender” (Brown et al., 2006).  It can also be used as a model of “insider 
threat,” or “competitor threat.”  In either case, we also assume the attacker and defender 
actions must be sequential, with the attacker first choosing disruptions (X) to the network 
to maximize the defender’s operating costs, followed by the defender choosing a set of 
activities (Y) to minimize the resulting operating costs.  The resulting model is 
max min ( , ).
YX
f Y X  
This attacker-defender (AD) model has been successfully applied in the 
analysis of many infrastructures over the past decade:  electric grids (Salmerón, Wood, & 
Baldick, 2004, 2009), theater ballistic missile defense  (Brown, Carlyle, Diehl, Kline, & 
Wood, 2005), oil pipelines and airport security  (Brown et al., 2005, 2006), and 
transportation systems (Alderson, Brown, Carlyle, & Wood, 2011).  There have been 
more than 150 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) case studies of individual 
infrastructures or military decision problems that have used AD models.   
All of these prior analyses with AD models consider only infrastructures 
in isolation.   
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Each of the above techniques identifies sets of critical components whose 
defense improves resilience within an individual infrastructure.  In all cases, these 
analyses also make the implicit assumption that any other supporting infrastructures are 
available and invulnerable to attack.  This can result in inaccurate assessments of network 
resilience that provide operators with a false sense of security.  
For example, consider the work of Salmerón et al. (2004, 2009) modeling 
electric power grids.  They formulate and solve AD models to help utility companies 
identify critical components and improve grid resilience.  While Salmerón et al. analyze 
vulnerabilities to physical attacks on the grid in detail, they acknowledge their work does 
not account for cyber attacks.  An electric grid’s reliance on telecommunications and 
Internet for control and on coal, natural gas, petroleum or water for generation is a 
significant vulnerability. 
4. Representing Dependence 
Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly (2001) define interdependence as “a bidirectional 
relationship between two infrastructures through which the state of each infrastructure 
influences or is correlated to the state of the other” (p. 14).  While it is perhaps obvious 
that infrastructure dependence relationships are crucial, it is less clear how to identify and 
subsequently represent them appropriately in an analysis.  Chou and Tseng (2010) 
describe a technique for automated “knowledge discovery” of critical infrastructure 
interdependence relationships based on the use of data mining in sets of recorded 
infrastructure failure data (p. 539).  Other researchers have proposed categories for 
dependence relationships, specifically based on class and type. 
a.  Class 
It is sometimes convenient to categorize infrastructure interdependence 
relationships by class.  Rinaldi et al. (2001) offer four classes as defined in previous 
literature:  physical, cyber, geographic and logical.  Using their definitions, a physical 
dependence is based upon the physical flow of a commodity (e.g., oil needed to run an 
electric generator), while cyber depends upon some form of transmitted data (e.g., 
supervisory control and data acquisition control of a steam valve).  Similarly, a 
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geographic dependence exists when components of separate infrastructures are 
geographically co-located, such that a physical attack or disruption to one system impacts 
other systems.  For example, consider the attack on a railroad bridge that also serves as a 
supporting structure for electrical and telecommunications cables.  It has been noted that 
a geographic relationship between components is a correlation, and not a true dependence 
(Bernstein, Bienstock, Hay, Uzunoglu, & Zussman, 2011).  Nevertheless, to keep in line 
with the bulk of literature, we refer to a geographic relationship here as a dependence. 
Rinaldi et al. (2001) place all other dependence relationships that are not physical, cyber 
or geographic into the logical class, such as those driven by policy, contractual or legal 
obligations, or market forces. 
b. Type 
In addition to categorizing dependence by class, it is sometimes helpful to 
define these relationships by type.  We consider five types used by other researchers:  
input, shared, exclusive-or, mutual, and co-located (Wallace et al., 2003; Lee, Mitchell, 
& Wallace, 2004, 2007).  For purposes of explanation, consider two infrastructures, A 
and B.  An input dependence is a one-way relationship between infrastructures; system A 
receives input from system B, but system B receives no input from system A.  A shared 
dependence exists when systems A and B share a common component or service.  An 
exclusive-or dependence arises when either system A or system B, but not both, can use a 
component or service.  A mutual dependence between infrastructures is a two-way 
relationship where both systems A and B receive input from each other, although not 
usually from interactions of same components or services.  Finally, in a co-located 
relationship, the systems do not depend on each other, but are located within the same 
geographic region, and may be similarly affected by some event (e.g., a natural disaster).  
The co-located dependence type is equivalent to the geographic class defined by Rinaldi 
et al. (2001).  Our models expand directly from these dependence types. 
5. Operational Models with Dependence 
Although we use minimum-cost network flow models to represent the operation 
of individual infrastructure systems in this thesis, in a real application we might need 
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something more complicated.  For example, electrical transmission models represent the 
physics of power flow, and these are not amenable to a simple network flow model.  
However, our main contribution is independent of the particular models used to represent 
the individual infrastructures.  What is important is the way that we model the 
interdependence relationships between infrastructure systems, and we do so using 
notation and terminology derived from the study of network flows.  We represent each of 
the various classes of relationships between infrastructure systems by modeling the flow 
of a commodity (e.g., electric power) from one system to another and by capturing how a 
sufficient flow of that commodity enables an activity (e.g., operating a particular water 
pump) in the other system.   
Before introducing our work, we examine the contributions of Kennedy (2009) 
and Lee et al. (2007).  They use network design models to demonstrate geographic and 
physical dependence respectively within collections of infrastructures. 
 a. Layered Interdependent Infrastructures 
Kennedy (2009) models network dependence between multiple 
infrastructures in a single network flow model with two sets of variables.  The first set of 
variables represents individual infrastructure activities, while the second, a set of binary 
variables, represents the satisfaction of dependence relationship requirements between 
infrastructures using binary directed arcs.  Each infrastructure exists as a separate layer 
within the model, connected to others through the dependence relationships (arcs) that 
exist between distinguished interdependent nodes.  He considers this collection of 
infrastructure layers and dependence relationships as a single, unified, directed graph of 
all flow activities, expressed as a single commodity. 
Kennedy defines “effects options” that can influence a subset of the 
interdependent components (nodes and arcs) within the collection of layered networks, 
and for each effect option, he defines the change on the individual components produced 
by the effect. He uses a cost-based formulation composed of two parts: the cost (or 
benefit) for activities within each layer of the network, and the cost (or benefit) of each 
effect option.  Each node has an associated supply or demand, and each arc has a 
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maximum capacity. Kennedy then models the layered network as a minimum-cost 
network and solves this monolithic model using Benders decomposition. 
Kennedy presents a reformulation of the classic network design problem 
with notation that reveals its applicability to design problems on layered networks.  His 
models are one-sided and do not involve an intelligent adversary.  For example, his 
formulation may be an attacker’s problem with the objective to either inflict maximum 
damage or fully disrupt a collection of infrastructures for a minimum cost.  The attacker’s 
costs would consist of both the costs to disrupt flow within each infrastructure and the 
costs associated with a particular effect option to cut selected interdependent arcs in the 
collection.  Similarly, in an operator’s problem, the costs might represent activity costs 
within each infrastructure, along with upgrade option costs for the collection.  Kennedy 
solves by enumerating through the finite number of effects options and interdependent 
links to identify the combination in this searched set that produces the desired result. 
The examples used to demonstrate Kennedy’s model assume a geographic 
(or co-located) source of dependence, for which his method is a viable solution.  
However, it is not clear how to apply Kennedy’s techniques to any dependence other than 
geographic co-location.  In order to model physical, cyber or logical links, one must 
define a more robust formulation than the binary link between infrastructure layers used 
in his work. 
b. Mixed-Integer Network Flow Model 
Lee et al. (2007) define mathematics to explicitly model the five types of 
infrastructure dependence relationships discussed in their previous work (Wallace et al., 
2003).  They show the modeling value with a case study.  They argue that prior efforts to 
represent dependence generally fall short because those efforts develop hybrid models 
that do not adequately capture the operation of the infrastructures, and therefore lose their 
value to the individual infrastructure operators.  Lee et al. create an interdependent layer 
network (ILN) of the electric, subway and telecommunications networks in lower 
Manhattan, model a disruption to the ILN and demonstrate the model’s usefulness in 
restoration of services. 
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We summarize the modeling methods introduced by Lee et al. (2007) for 
each of the five types of dependence relationships below. 
 (1)  Input Dependence.  When an infrastructure h requires input 
from infrastructure i, Lee et al. (2007) model the location at which this dependence 
occurs as a transshipment node l in h, and use a binary connector variable ,,i jh ly  to 
represent adequate supply at node j in i to allow the function of node l in h (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.   Input Dependence according to Lee et al.   
Node l in infrastructure h requires input from node j in infrastructure i.  The 
binary connector variable ,,i jh ly  represents whether or not adequate supply is 
provided. 
 
Lee et al. (2007) use balance-of-flow equations to determine the 
potential commodity shortfall, ijs , at any node j in infrastructure i.  They also give each 
node a weighting factor ijk , and, while not explicitly stated, we assume this weighting 
factor is a penalty assigned for not meeting demand.  The ILN objective function contains 
a term that is the product of each shortfall variable with its respective weighting factor  
i i
j j




Lee et al. (2007) include a constraint that relates the shortfall 
variable to the connector variable, ensuring the linking variable allows operation of node 
l ( ),, 1i jh ly =  only if no shortfall at node i exists, i.e., 
,
,(1 )( )
i i j i
j jh ls y b≤ − − , 
for certain combinations of i, j, h, and l. 
Infrastructure h 
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j 
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Defining the relationship between the operational capacity of node 
l and the state of the connector variable requires additional constraints, and each is 
involved via a linear relationship.  For example, if l is a transshipment node, its flow 




h ly   as shown 
in the following equation (note ( )e lδ +∈ represents all inbound arcs to node l and hex  is 




h h i j





again, for certain combinations of  i, j, h and l. 
Therefore, if the connector variable is zero, then the node capacity 
is also zero, but when the node connector variable is one, the node capacity equals its 
rated capacity.  Lee et al. discuss the possibility that the demand node’s capacity can vary 
in other ways, as opposed to simply switching between the rated capacity and zero.  Their 
modeling can accommodate this. 
Although the Lee et al. formulation is more complex than the 
simplification described above (with differing subsets and constraints for demand, supply 
and transshipment nodes), the main concept remains the same.  Commodity shortfall at a 
parent node that supplies commodity to another infrastructure prevents operation of that 
supported child node.  In addition, weighted slack variables are included in the objective 
function.  Minimizing the overall objective function tends to drive all slack variables to 
zero, thereby supplying the necessary flow between interdependent networks, if possible. 
(2)  Mutual Dependence.  Lee et al. (2007) consider mutual 
dependence in terms of infrastructures (A and B), where infrastructure A relies on 
infrastructure B for some supply and vice versa.  In this case, a mutual dependence 
becomes two sets of input dependence relationships, where a parent node in A supports a 
child node in B, and a separate parent node in B supports a child node in A.  Modeling 
then follows that of the input dependence. 
(3)  Shared Dependence.  Lee et al. (2007) consider shared 
dependence to represent multiple commodities flowing across the same arcs or nodes.  
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They, therefore, define n N∈ as a commodity in the set of commodities N, and 
subsequently ensure the sum of all commodity flows across an arc or node is less than the 









for each arc e of infrastructure i. 
(4)  Exclusive-or Dependence.  This dependence is similar to 
shared dependence where a component is available to two or more commodities, but only 
one can use it at a time.  This requires the addition of a commodity flag (binary) to 

















again, for each arc e of infrastructure i. 
Equation (1.4) serves the same purpose as (1.3) where r turns the 
flow of i on arc e on or off as needed.  Equation (2.5) restricts the number of commodities 
that can flow on arc e simultaneously (here, just one). 
(5)  Co-located Dependence.  Lee et al. (2007) do not explicitly 
consider co-location within their formulation, but leave it to the operator to determine co-
location effects and manually adjust the model to account for the changes in supply, 
demand or capacity. 
To summarize, the ILN formulation and case study introduced by Lee et 
al. (2007) show it is possible to represent infrastructure dependence relationships in a 
unified model without losing required fidelity of any particular system model.   
While they discuss shared and exclusive-or dependence in regards to 
sharing flow of multiple commodities across a common node or arc (pipelines or roads), 
we argue this description does not fully represent the possibilities of either type of 
dependence.  Instead, we model shared and exclusive-or dependence in terms of what is 
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required for operation of a child node, as opposed to simply the restrictions on type of 
commodity flow within a single infrastructure.  Lee et al.’s formulation is designed to 
minimize the cost to restore services post-attack, and it does not consider an intelligent 
attacker; thus, it serves as another example of a network design model.  
6. Our Contribution in Context  
We use the attacker-defender model as a basis for a worst-case analysis, which is 
“crucial to a credible assessment of infrastructure vulnerability and for planning 
mitigating actions” (Brown et al., 2006, p. 543).  We take advantage of both the cost-
based, co-location formulation of Kennedy (2009) and dependence type formulations of 
Lee et al. (2007), and introduce a taxonomy of dependence relationships.  We incorporate 
each dependence type into an operational-level AD model of infrastructure behavior, we 
formulate and solve a sequence of models to illustrate how the dependence relationships 
create vulnerabilities that are not apparent in the single-infrastructure models, and we 
assess the consequences of disruptions to the system of infrastructures.  We provide 
complete documentation for how to apply these techniques to real infrastructure problems 
and include a discussion of the necessary assumptions, as well as the pros and cons of our 
methods.  Finally, we present examples of how to provide relevant, understandable 
results to help decision makers, such as where to add limited investments. 
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II. MODEL FORMULATION 
A. SINGLE INFRASTRUCTURE IN ISOLATION 
We begin with a model for the operation of a single infrastructure in isolation.  
Without loss of generality, we assume the objective is to minimize the cost associated 
with infrastructure operation.  In what follows, we will refer to the operator as the 
“defender’ to keep in line with the literature.  We define necessary terms and present the 
basic defender’s problem before introducing the concept of an attacker and formulating 
the attacker’s problem. 
1. Defender Problem (D) 
For clarity of exposition, we formulate each defender’s problem as an 
optimization of commodity flows over a set of nodes and arcs.  (We stress again that 
much more general models are admitted by our methods, but these networks are easy to 
illustrate and discuss.)  These models involve balance of flow constraints and can have 
additional side constraints on the flow.  We adopt standard definitions and notation 
common to the study of network flows, formally defined in Ahuja, Magnanti and Orlin 
(1993); see Figure 2.  Let g=(N,A) represent a directed graph, where N is a set of nodes 
and A N N⊆ ×  is a set of directed arcs.  For each arc ( , )i j A∈ , we let Yij denote 
commodity flow from i to j, uij represent the arc capacity, and cij indicate the normal 
operating cost per unit of commodity flow across arc ( , )i j A∈ .  For each n N∈ , we 
define the commodity supply as bn, with bn>0 for supply and bn<0 for demand.  We refer 
to a node that has no supply or demand (i.e., bn=0) as a transshipment node. 
 
 
    







Infrastructure operators are often concerned with both excess commodity and 
shortages within their network as both may incur network costs and even degrade 
infrastructure function.  For this reason, we define an excess (EXCESSn) and shortage 
(SHORTn) of commodity per node and associated per-unit costs associated with each, 
ePenn and aPenn respectively (these costs can be zero if, for example, excesses are 
acceptable).  When the balance of flow constraint for node n is formulated using these 
variables (and associated costs), we say that this constraint has been made elastic, and 
call these additional variables that measure conventional constraint violations elastic 
variables. 
No infrastructure is immune to disruption, whether a pump seizes in a water 
system, a power line in an electric grid snaps from a winter storm, or an enemy bombs a 
bridge in a transportation network.  We collectively refer to any component loss in our 
models as an “interdiction,” where it can be caused by a mechanical failure, a random act 
of nature, the deliberate actions of an intelligent adversary, or a host of other reasons.  
We consider two types: arc interdiction and node interdiction.  In our model, we let the 
binary value ijX  represent the interdiction of arc ( , )i j A∈ , with 0ijX =  representing a 
fully functioning arc and 1ijX =  indicating the arc has been interdicted.  In this model, an 
interdicted arc ( , )i j A∈  has an additional per-unit operating cost qij.  Presumably, this 
cost can be high enough to preclude any function of the interdicted arc at all. 
We also wish to model node interdiction.  We do this through “node-splitting,” 
whereby a node n is replicated into two nodes, n’ and n” with a single directed arc 
( )', "n n A∈  allowing flow between them.  All inbound arcs (i, n) to n for i N∈  enter n’ 
and all outbound arcs (n, j) from n for j N∈  exit n” (Figure 3).  With this modification, 
interdiction of directed arc (n’, n”) is equivalent to interdiction of the original node n.  
Note that the interdicted cost for node n is qn’n” (after node-splitting), and that presumably 





Figure 3.   Representation of node-splitting. 
 
The cost to operate an arc is a product of the amount of flow on an arc (Yij) and 
the total per-unit operating cost for that arc.   This total arc cost consists of the normal 
per-unit operating cost (cij), and, if the arc is not functional ( )1ijX = , the per-unit 
interdiction cost (qij).  The total operating cost for the network is the sum of the operating 
costs across the set A of all arcs in the network.   
This per-unit cost qij is equivalent to paying a premium to deliver flow, possibly 
by going outside the system.  For example, shipping oil along an interdicted pipe segment 
could mean hiring a caravan of trucks to move the flow around the unusable section of 
pipe.  This could be very expensive, but if the alternatives are worse, we expect that an 
operator will do it.  By setting qij carefully, we ensure the model reflects the desired 
behavior. 
We represent the penalty cost at a node by the product of its commodity shortage 
(SHORTn) and its penalty cost per unit (sPenn) or the product of its excess supply amount 
(EXCESSn) and its penalty cost (ePenn).  The total penalty cost for the infrastructure 
equals the sum of all penalty costs over the set of nodes, N. 
We summarize the single-infrastructure defender problem (D) as follows. 
Indices and index sets [~cardinality] 
n N∈  Nodes in an infrastructure   (alias i, j)  [moderate] 
( , )∈ ⊆ ×i j A N N  Directed arcs (edges with 




n n' n" 
Yn'n" 
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Given Data [units] 
nb  Supply (a negative value indicates a demand) 
of commodity at node n  
[commodity unit] 
nePen  Penalty for commodity excess at node n [cost/unit] 
nsPen  Penalty for commodity shortage at node n [cost/unit] 
uij
 Capacity of arc ( , )i j A∈    [commodity unit] 
cij Cost per-unit of operating arc ( , )i j A∈  [cost/unit] 
qij Additional cost per-unit of operating 
interdicted arc ( , )i j A∈  
[cost/unit] 
ijX  Indicates interdiction of arc 
( , )i j A∈  
1ijX =  is interdicted, 0ijX =  not interdicted 
[binary] 
Decision variables [units] 
nEXCESS
 
Commodity excess at node n [commodity unit] 
nSHORT
 
Commodity shortage at node n [commodity unit] 
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This single-commodity minimum cost network flow model represents the 
defender’s problem.  Given fixed disruptions X , the objective function (2.1) expresses 
the operating cost incurred  by commodity flow Y, while constraint (2.2) represents the 
balance of flow for every node in the network.  We restrict commodity flow (Yij) between 
the arc capacity (uij) and zero in constraint (2.3).  Equation (2.4) is the non-negativity 
constraint for the elastic variables, and Equation (2.5) represents any other side 
constraints pertaining to the activities Y, whether physical or logical.  While Equation 
(2.1) explicitly shows the minimization is with regard to variables Y, EXCESS and 
SHORT, we will subsequently write “ min
Y
“ for brevity with the understanding that we are 
also minimizing with respect to the EXCESS and SHORT variables, as well.  
The infrastructure operator is myopic in this problem; he does not concern himself 
with anything outside his individual infrastructure.  He observes, and may actually set as 
constants exogenous to his optimization, the interdicted and non-interdicted arc costs, 
node supply and demand, and penalties for commodity shortages or excess supply.  In 
addition, even though the operator may not control the functionality of system 
components, the formulation allows him to adapt to identified outages ( )1ijX =  and 
operate his degraded system so as to minimize cost.  
2. Attacker Problem (AD) 
Consider an intelligent adversary (attacker) wishing to disrupt the system 
operation.  Brown et al. (2005) show that several assumptions are required for this 
problem.  First, we assume the defender will always operate his infrastructure optimally.  
Regardless of attacks or component failures, the defender will adjust his system operation 
as necessary to continue to minimize his cost of operation.  Therefore, for a given level of 
attack resources (Γ), we assume the attacker’s goal is to maximize the defender’s 
resulting cost.  ijX is now a decision variable for the attacker.  We also assume the 
attacker has perfect knowledge of the targeted infrastructure.  This may not be true, but 
conservatively allows us to identify the worst-case scenario for the defender.  The 
attacker plans his attacks to maximize the defender’s minimum cost given his attack 
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resources, knowing that the defender will subsequently adjust his operations as required 
to minimize cost.  
We summarize the single-infrastructure attacker problem (AD) as follows. 
Decision variables [units] 
Xij Indicates interdiction of arc ( , )i j A∈  
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By adding the attacker to the original defender’s problem (D), the new 
formulation (AD) becomes a two-stage optimization problem.  The objective function 
(2.6) expresses with respect to attacks (X) the operating cost incurred by commodity flow 
(Y).  Constraints (2.2–2.5) remain the same as in the defender’s problem.  Equation (2.7) 
restricts the attack resources to a given feasible region, Γ.  As stated here, attacks (X) 
interdict directed arcs.  In cases where an attack impedes flow in both directions (e.g., 
both sides of a divided highway), we can additionally require that ij jiX X= . 
The importance of AD lies in the identification of the most vulnerable 
components, or “critical assets” of an infrastructure for a given attack level. This has led 
to much work finding various infrastructure vulnerabilities and mitigating them, 
championed by researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School (Salmerón et al., 2004; 
Brown et al., 2005, 2006; Brown, Carlyle, & Wood, 2008, Alderson et al., 2011).  Model 
AD serves as the building block for our infrastructure interdependence models. 
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B. MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT OPERATORS 
We now consider a more global perspective, one in which we have a collection of 
infrastructures.  We assume that each infrastructure is independent and operated by a 
separate system operator concerned with minimizing his individual infrastructure 
operating costs. As in the single-infrastructure case, each operator disregards the 
surrounding infrastructures.  We introduce the concept of a global manager wishing to 
minimize the cost of the entire collection of infrastructures, we define necessary terms, 
and we present the basic problem structure before introducing the concept of an 
adversary and subsequent formulation of the attacker problem.  The global manager is 
now the “defender” as opposed to any of the independent selfish infrastructure operators. 
1. Defender Problem (MULTI-D) 
Consider a set of infrastructures R, where r R∈ represents an individual 
infrastructure.  We assume all nodes are unique and that each is present in only one 
infrastructure.  Therefore, let ( )R n R∈  denote the infrastructure in which node n resides, 
while rN N⊆  denotes the set of all nodes in infrastructure r. 
How does a global manager of a collection of infrastructures value its 
performance?  To answer this, we assume the manager desires to minimize the total 
operating cost of the collection, just as each individual operator seeks to minimize the 
cost of his respective infrastructure.  Therefore, the global manager’s objective function 
is built in the same manner, with costs tied to everyday operation and penalties for unmet 
requirements. 
Individual infrastructure operators may measure their operating costs in different 
ways.  The owner of an electric grid might think in terms of megawatt hours (MWh) of 
electricity, while the oil producer might think in terms of barrels of oil.  A global 
manager might use current prices ($/MWh and $/barrel) to convert to a uniform standard, 
dollars ($).  We introduce hr to serve as this relative cost conversion factor for each 
infrastructure, and multiply it by the network operating costs of infrastructure r. 
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The global manager must also specify a way to compare the penalty costs for 
different infrastructures.  However, unlike operating costs, the penalty costs are more 
subjective.  For example, consider the operators of a city water infrastructure and a local 
metro system. Within their respective infrastructures, each owner might individually 
impose stiff penalties for not meeting demand.  Nevertheless, in the event of a major 
disruption, a city manager overseeing both infrastructures might value water distribution 
to the citizens as a higher priority than mass transit because of secondary effects 
(dehydration, sickness) that come from not having adequate potable water.  In this case, 
the global penalties for water shortages could reflect this and be set higher than those for 
shortages in the mass transit system.  We implement this in our model through use of pr, 
a policy weighting given to each infrastructure.  Like hr, we must ensure that any policy 
weights introduced yield objective function values in standard units (e.g., dollars). 
The parameter hr is a way to equalize costs; it can be set by individual operators if 
a common cost baseline has been set by the global manager of the infrastructure 
collection.  Setting the system-wide policy weights (pr) requires either a quantitative 
assessment of secondary effects or a qualitative assessment of relative importance (i.e., a 
policy decision), of individual infrastructure shortages on the entire collection.   




Indices and index sets [~cardinality] 
∈r R  
Infrastructures in a 
system (alias r’) [few] 
( )∈R n R  Infrastructure of node n  [few] 
rn N N∈ ⊆  
Nodes in infrastructure r: 
( ){ }:rN n R n r≡ =   [moderate] 
( , ) ri j A A∈ ⊆  
Arcs in infrastructure r: 
( ), :
( ) ( )r
i j A
A
R i R j r
∈  ≡  
= =  
  [many] 
Data [units, if applicable] 
rh  Cost conversion factor given to infrastructure r to 
equalize costs amongst system of infrastructures 
(cost structure) 
[global $/local $] 
rp  System-wide policy weight given to infrastructure r 
to reflect secondary effects or relative importance of 
infrastructures (policy decision) 











ij ij ij ijY r R i j A
r
n n n n
r R n N
f Y X h c q X Y
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Even though each infrastructure has its own distinct activities, this is essentially a 
single-commodity minimum cost objective representing the global manager’s problem 
for a collection of infrastructures.  The objective function (2.8) now reflects the use of the 
cost conversion factor (hr) adjusting the relative network operating costs, as well as the 
policy weight (pr) regulating the infrastructure penalties according to policy guidance.  
Even though this objective has a global perspective, the infrastructures are still 
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independent, resulting in an objective function that is a sum of the individual weighted 
infrastructure objective functions.  Thus, the model is separable by infrastructure.  
MULTI-D constraints mirror those in D (Equations 2.2– 2.5). 
The manager for the collection of systems imposes his global view of relative 
importance through the setting of hr and pr.  Given these values, the individual 
infrastructure operator makes locally optimal activity decisions based only on 
information within his infrastructure, but using the global manager’s objective guidance. 
2. Attacker Problem (MULTI-AD) 
Consider the perspective of an attacker who can allocate his attack resources (Γ) 
among several independent infrastructures.  In the single-infrastructure case, if an 
attacker possesses the resources for only one attack, he will interdict the activity that 
maximizes the operator’s cost.  Assuming all interdictions have the same resource 
requirements for the attacker, and with multiple infrastructures to consider, the same 
attacker can now interdict the activity amongst all infrastructures that maximizes the total 
system operating cost.  Therefore, even though the infrastructures are independent, this is 
a relaxation of AD so the attacker can do no worse.  Given additional resources, the 
attacker’s influence on the defender’s collection of infrastructures is likely to be much 
greater than if he was only targeting one network.  
The defender’s problem remains as MULTI-D; he is attempting to minimize the 
weighted costs of his collection of infrastructures.  We maintain all attacker-defender 
assumptions from AD; therefore the attacker now has perfect knowledge of the 
defender’s cost conversion factors and policy weights, while the defender will continue to 
operate the system of infrastructures optimally post-interdiction.   
As with the operator’s problem, the attacker’s objective function for multiple 
independent infrastructures sums over the weighted infrastructure costs, but does so 
within the two-stage, attacker-defender AD model.  To represent an intelligent attacker, 
the fixed attacks ijX  are replaced by decision variables ijX .  All constraints remain as in 
AD (Equations 2.2–2.5 and 2.7). 
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C. DIRECT COST-BASED DEPENDENCE 
In July 2001, a freight train derailment in the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore, 
Maryland, ignited a chemical fire that burned for days.  The incident affected local auto, 
bus and train transportation, ruptured a main in the water infrastructure, interrupted 
power to a portion of Baltimore, disrupted East Coast railroad service, and slowed 
Internet use nationwide due to the destruction of fiber-optic cables in the tunnel serving 
three of the largest U.S. Internet service providers (DoT, 2002). 
This is an example of a geographic (Rinaldi et al., 2001) or co-location (Wallace 
et al., 2003) dependence, where the disruption in one infrastructure directly affects others, 
due only to their spatial proximity to a single interdiction. We use costs to represent 
geographic dependence, but we are not restricted to modeling co-located components.  
Our formulation allows any cost-based limits on courses of action and activities to be 
established as needed by the global manager. 
1. Defender Problem (DIRECT-D) 
To incorporate direct cost-based dependence relationships, we simply expand the 
interdicted cost in previous models from qij to qijkl, so the latter now represents the 
additional cost to operate on arc ( , )i j A∈  due to interdiction of arc ( , )k l A∈ .  In this 
manner, a cost-based link may exist between any arc and node in any infrastructure 
through use of the interdicted-cost, qijkl.  We represent interdicted costs for nodes by 
splitting the node and assigning the interdicted cost to the internal arc.  For simplicity, we 
also use the term component to refer to any node or arc within a network. 
Components need not be strictly co-located for an interdiction in one system to 
affect another.  We can depict a local dependence or broader dependence relationships.  
The flexibility of this method is best displayed through several examples. 
To demonstrate local geographic dependence, consider a bridge in a 
transportation network.  In addition to carrying local vehicular traffic, suppose that it also 
carries a water pipe, electric, telephone and fiber-optic cables over a river.  As the loss of 
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the bridge will also result in the loss of the corresponding pipes and cables, the respective 
arcs in each of the other four infrastructures will have non-zero interdicted costs. 
In addition, we can model dependence on a larger scale (geographic or otherwise), 
such that flow disruption in an infrastructure affects other networks outside the local area.  
Consider a severe interruption in local ground transportation as would be caused by the 
collapse of the Hernando de Soto Bridge in Memphis carrying Interstate 40 across the 
Mississippi River.  This bridge serves as a major east-west artery across the United States 
and is only one of two crossings over the Mississippi in the Memphis area, serving 
approximately 45,000–50,000 vehicles a day (MyFox Memphis, 2010).  This disruption 
would require the use of Interstate 55 as an alternate east-west route across the river, 
already serving 48,000–50,000 vehicles a day.  The resulting congestion on Interstate 55 
can be captured in an operator’s model using an interdiction cost, as the decrease in 
traffic speeds results in increased operational costs for shipping companies and other 
infrastructures relying on this stretch of Interstate 40. 
Of course, through use of this interdicted cost, we can also represent arc 
independence; where flow disruption in one infrastructure does not affect another in any 
manner ( )0ijklq = . 
Defining qijkl requires intimate knowledge of each infrastructure in the global 
collection in order to accurately portray the cost relationships.  Therefore, qijkl cannot be 
completely defined by any single infrastructure operator; it must have the oversight of the 
global manager.  In the case of geographic dependence, the manager must first know 
what components within the collection are co-located, and with the help of individual 
operators, determine the damage or cost to each infrastructure component if an 
interdiction occurs in a co-located component.  In practice, identifying geographic co-
location is a major effort, often requiring the use of geographic information systems 
(Grubesic & Murray, 2006; Lee et al., 2007; Robert & Marabito, 2010; Bernstein et al., 
2011). 
We summarize the direct cost-based dependence defender problem (DIRECT-D) 
as follows. 
 27 
Data [units, if applicable] 
ijklq  First-order, per-unit cost of operating on arc ( , )i j A∈
induced by interdiction of arc ( , )k l A∈    
[cost/unit] 
Objective (DIRECT-D)  
( )
( , ) ( , )
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This is a single-commodity, minimum-cost network flow model representing the 
defender’s problem for a collection of infrastructures with direct cost-based dependence 
relationships.  The objective function (Equation 2.9) differs from MULTI-D only in the 
interdicted cost, qijkl, and represents the minimum cost to operate the system of 
infrastructures.  The constraints remain the same as in prior operator models D and 
MULTI-D (Equations 2.2–2.5). 
The global manager now must understand cost-based relationships between each 
infrastructure in his collection.  If the only direct dependence relationships are due to co-
location, he must be able to define the full set of co-located components for his network 
operators.  The global manager now relies on each individual system operator to define 
interdicted costs for all nodes and arcs affected by interdicted components ( )0ijklq ≠ .  As 
these interdictable components may or may not be in some operator’s own infrastructure, 
this process can be detailed and cumbersome, but it provides the fidelity necessary to 
accurately determine collection vulnerabilities due to any cost-based dependence.  With 
knowledge of the known disruptions and interdicted costs, along with the cost conversion 
factor and policy weight for his infrastructure (provided by the global manager), the 
infrastructure operator can make his activity decisions without regard to the other 
infrastructures in the collection. 
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2. Attacker Problem (DIRECT-AD) 
Consider an intelligent attacker wishing to disrupt this system of infrastructures. 
Given perfect knowledge of the interdicted costs qijkl, along with penalty costs (ePenn, 
sPenn) and infrastructure cost conversion factor and policy decisions (hr, pr), he can now 
take advantage of known dependence.  The cost-based dependence relationships allow 
the attacker to impact multiple infrastructures with a single attack, magnifying the 
potential impact of his attack resources. 
Contrary to the attacker’s improved situation over MULTI-AD, the defender 
suffers additional vulnerabilities through these direct cost-based dependence 
relationships.  Although the global manager still directs minimization of the collective 
costs among his infrastructures, the impact of interdictions can now propagate throughout 
the networks as opposed to interdictions affecting single infrastructures. 
DIRECT-AD is identical in formulation to MULTI-AD, with the exception of 
the interdicted costs (qijkl) and the attack variables (Xkl) in the objective function.  
Constraints remain identical to AD (Equations 2.2– 2.5 and 2.7). 
D. INDIRECT COMMODITY FLOW DEPENDENCE 
The five dependence types (input, shared, exclusive-or, mutual, and co-location) 
already referenced from prior literature are defined in terms of relationships between 
infrastructures, not individual components (Wallace et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2004, 2007).  
For example, in their definitions, an input dependence refers to an infrastructure requiring 
one or more services from another infrastructure.  In modeling dependence relationships 
at the component level (node or arc), we make further distinctions between types for 
completeness.  We redefine and model input, shared, exclusive-or and mutual 
dependence, along with introducing two additional types, substitute and complimentary. 
Although some researchers (Rinaldi et al., 2001; Rinaldi, 2004) refer to any 
situation where one infrastructure depends on commodity output from another 
infrastructure as a “physical” dependence; we refer to these collectively as an indirect 
dependence.  We interpret the cost-based dependence relationships (co-located 
components for example) from the previous section as directly impacting the operator’s 
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objective function.  In contrast, the flows from one infrastructure to another only 
indirectly impact the operator’s objective function.   
1. Derivation of Dependence Type Formulations 
Borrowing terminology from Lee et al.  (2007), we define all commodity flows 
between infrastructures as originating at a parent node and terminating at a child arc.  By 
performing node-splitting, we can model node-node interdependence relationships as 
needed.  We define S N⊆  as the set of parent nodes providing commodity flow to 
supported infrastructures, and D A⊆  as the set of child arcs dependent on commodity 
flow from supporting infrastructures.  Let [ , ( , )]n i j G S D∈ ⊆ ×  be a node-arc pair 
representing infrastructure dependence.  By construction, each child arc ( , )i j D∈  
requires a certain threshold (thresholdnij) of commodity from its parent node n S∈  to 
support arc operation.  Let Vnij denote the amount of commodity flow that parent node 
n S∈  provides to arc ( , )i j D∈ .  Finally, by definition, if Vnij is at least thresholdnij, then 
arc (i,j) has the required commodity needed for operation.  We use a binary transfer 
variable Tnij to indicate operation of arc ( ),i j D∈ , where 1nijT =  allows for the operation 
of arc ( ),i j D∈ , while 0nijT =  indicates commodity flow has not met the threshold 
required to operate the child arc. 
a. Single-Input Dependence 
Each indirect, component-level dependence is an input dependence 
according to Wallace et al.’s definition (2003).  Therefore, we define a single-input 
dependence at the component level as a single (parent node, child arc) pair
[ ], ( , )n i j G S D∈ ⊆ × , with the parent node supporting only one child arc, and the child 
arc requiring commodity from a single parent node as in Figure 4.   
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Figure 4.   Graphical representation of single-input dependence. 
Child arc (i,j) (infrastructure II) requires commodity from parent node n 
(infrastructure I) to operate. The horizontal arrow indicates dependence 
between infrastructure components.  The black vertical line indicates flow 
does not enter supported infrastructure as commodity flow, but is necessary 
for operation of the receiving arc.  Arrows indicate direction of flow, both 
inter- and intra-infrastructure. 
 
As an example of an input dependence, consider an electrically-operated 
valve in a natural gas transfer system.  The valve requires power from an electrical supply 
to operate and allow transfer of natural gas through the pipeline.  Without electrical 
power, the valve will remain in its default position (closed) and control of the gas is not 
possible.  The electrical system itself receives no direct benefit from supplying power to 
the valve, but sees the requirement as a demand on the electrical infrastructure.   
We capture a single-input dependence of a child arc (i,j) on a parent node 










Equation (2.10) sets the binary transfer variable 1nijT =  only if the 
commodity flow Vnij from parent node n is at least the required threshold (thresholdnij).  
Equation (2.11) then reduces the upper bound of the child arc flow Yij to be zero if 
0nijT = . 
The dependence relationship modeled with Equations (2.10) and (2.11) 
assumes a binary relationship between the child arc (i, j) flow capacity and commodity 






  i 
j 
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the child arc flow capacity is dependent on the amount of commodity flow provided by 
the parent node even after activation of the arc ( 1)nijT = .  To model this situation, we 
require identification of the child arc capacity ( )iju when the minimum threshold flow is 
provided by the parent node ( )nij nijV threshold= , and the commodity flow from the parent 
node ( )nijV  that allows for maximum child arc capacity ( )iju .  Figure 5 provides a 
comparison of binary and linear input dependence relationships.   
 
 
Figure 5.   Relationships between commodity flow ( )nijV from parent node n, and flow 
capacity ( )iju of child arc (i, j). 
For a binary relationship, if the parent node n does not meet the threshold 
flow needed, the child arc capacity is zero.  However, if nij nijV threshold≥ , 
the child arc capacity is iju .  For a linear relationship, meeting the threshold 
results in a lower capacity on the child arc iju , and further increases in 
provided flow results in child arc capacity increases, until the maximum arc 
capacity iju  is reached. 
 
We capture the single-input dependence with a linear relationship between 
parent node n commodity flow and child arc (i, j) capacity with Equations (2.10), (2.11) 
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Equation (2.12) sets the child arc capacity for a linear relationship between 
Vnij and uij.  An additional term is required to ensure the capacity remains non-negative 
for values of Vnij less than thresholdnij. 
b. Exclusive-or Dependence 
We define an exclusive-or dependence as a single parent node n S∈
supporting multiple child arcs, but capable of providing the necessary flow to only one 
child arc ( , )i j D∈  at a time; see Figure 6.  Although this figure depicts child arcs (i,j) 
and (k,l) in separate infrastructures (II and III, respectively), there may be more than two 




Figure 6.   Graphical representation of exclusive-or dependence.   
Parent node n (infrastructure I) can supply the necessary commodity to 
either child arc (i,j) (infrastructure II) or child arc (k,l) (infrastructure III) for 
operation of a single child arc, but not more than one.  The dashed black line 
indicates the infrastructure II dependence that is not being supported, while 
the solid black line indicates infrastructure III is supported. 
 
Consider as an example of an exclusive-or dependence the case where an 
electrical transfer bus provides power to run a motor or charge a battery.  If the bus power 
is used for the creation of mechanical power, it is not available to charge the battery and 
vice versa.   
We represent an exclusive-or dependence between two child arcs (i, j) and 





































Equations (2.10) and (2.13) set the transfer variable based upon the 
relationship between commodity flow and required threshold, while Equations (2.11) and 
(2.14) set the upper bound flow on the respective child arcs based upon the transfer 
variable value.  Equation (2.15) requires a single dependence relationship for n.  The 
number of candidate child arcs is not limited to two, and Equation (2.15) can have an 
arbitrary number of transfer variable terms on its lefthand side. 
c. Shared Dependence 
We define a shared dependence as a single parent node n S∈  supplying 
commodity to multiple child arcs ( ),i j D∈  and capable of supporting them concurrently, 
as shown in Figure 7.  Let max_supportablen represent the maximum number of 
interdependence links node n S∈ can support. 
 
Figure 7.   Graphical representation of shared dependence. 
Arc (i,j) (infrastructure II) and arc (k,l) (infrastructure III) each require 
commodity from node n (infrastructure I) to operate. 
 
Consider the case of a homeowner’s solar power system.  Suppose that he 
can use the electricity provided by the solar power system to heat his water and meet his 
















Any infrastructure component that provides a service to multiple supported components 
simultaneously serves as an example of a shared dependence. 
We represent a shared dependence between two child arcs (i, j) and (k, l) 
and a parent node n in a similar manner to exclusive-or, maintaining Equations (2.10) 
through (2.14) to set the transfer variables and control the upper bound on dependent 
commodity flows.  We replace Equation (2.15) with (2.16) to restrict the number of 
dependence relationships n S∈ can support. 
( , ):( ,( , ))
_ (2.16)nij n




Equation (2.16) can have an arbitrary number of transfer variable terms. 
d. Substitute Dependence 
We define substitute dependence as a single child arc ( , )k l D∈  requiring 
commodity from at least one of several parent nodes n S∈  to operate, as shown in  
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.   Graphical representation of substitute dependence. 
Either node i (infrastructure I) or node j (infrastructure II) must supply arc 
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As an example of substitute dependence, consider a water system’s 
pumping station that can be operated either by electricity from the grid, or from a 
gasoline-powered backup generator.     
We represent substitute dependence of a child arc (k,l) on two 
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Equations (2.17) and (2.18) set the respective transfer variables 
independently based upon available flow from each parent node.  The commodity flow 
upper bound on the child arc is set with constraint (2.19) by summing the transfer 
variables and multiplying by the arc capacity.  The normal arc capacity constraint 
(Equation 2.3) still applies, such that the arc flow Ykl will not exceed the arc capacity, 
even if each parent node supplies the necessary commodity. 
e. Complimentary Dependence 
We define a complimentary dependence as a single child arc ( , )k l D∈  
requiring commodity from more than one parent node n S∈ to operate, as shown in 
Figure 9.  Let min_requiredkl represent the minimum number of dependence links that arc ( ),k l D∈  requires.  We also require another binary variable Wkl, to indicate 
whether all required threshold commodities needed for operation are provided.  Consider 
the case where 1iklT =  and 1jklT = , indicating nodes i and j are meeting their respective 
required thresholds (thresholdikl and thresholdjkl).  If both commodities are required for 
operation of arc ( ),k l D∈ , then 1klW =  if and only if both 1iklT =  and 1jklT = . 
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Figure 9.   Graphical representation of complimentary dependence. 
Both node i (infrastructure I) and node j (infrastructure II) must supply arc 
(k,l) (infrastructure III) with needed commodity for its operation. 
 
As an example of a complimentary dependence, consider a water system 
pumping station that needs both electricity and water to operate.  We represent a 
complimentary dependence of child arc (k, l) on two parent nodes i and j with Equations 
(2.17) and (2.18) along with the following additional constraints: 
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 Equations (2.17) and (2.18) set the individual transfer variables (Tikl and 
Tjkl, while constraint (2.20) sets the child arc transfer variable (Wkl) based upon required 
dependence relationships.  We set the arc flow upper bound with Equation (2.21) in 
concert with normal arc capacity constraint (2.3). 
f. Mutual Dependence 
A mutual dependence at the infrastructure level rarely translates to a 
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parent nodes and child arcs, mutual dependence can only arise between node pairs in 
separate infrastructures, where each node relies on commodity flow from the other.  We 
model this through use of node-splitting as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Graphical representation of mutual dependence. 
Node i (infrastructure I) and node j (infrastructure II) each depend on 
commodity from the other infrastructure to operate.  To model, we perform 
node-splitting and represent this as node-arc dependence. 
 
Consider an electric power generator directly supplying a pump or 
compressor in a natural gas network.  If the pump is also the source of natural gas supply 
for the generator, a mutual dependence exists.   
We represent a mutual dependence of child arcs (i’, i”) and (j’, j”) on 
parent nodes j” and i” respectively using the following additional constraints: 
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Equations (2.22) and (2.23) set the respective transfer variables to allow 














2. Defender Problem (INDIRECT-D) 
With indirect dependence relationships present between infrastructures, the global 
manager now has a more complex system to consider.  We assume each infrastructure 
operator knows both his parent node and child arc dependence relationships.  The 
operators report the status of their parent nodes to the global manager and he in turn 
passes the status of dependence links to supported infrastructure operators so that they 
may operate their individual networks efficiently. 
Through the independent formulations of our six dependence types, we 
summarize all notation required for the formulation of the complete dependence defender 
problem (INDIRECT_D) as follows. 
Indices and index sets 
S N⊆  
Nodes supplying commodity flow to another 
infrastructure 
[few] 
D A⊆  
Arcs that depend on commodity flow from 
another infrastructure 
[few] 
( ), ,n i j G S D∈ ⊆ ×    




Data [units, if applicable] 
thresholdnij Threshold of input commodity needed 
at arc ( ),i j A∈  from node n S∈  
[commodity unit] 
max_supportablen Number of dependence links that 




Number of dependence links that arc 





Decision variables [units, if applicable] 
Tnij Variable indicating whether node n S∈  is 
providing the threshold commodity needed 
for operation of arc ( ),i j D∈  
[binary] 
Wij Variable indicating whether arc ( ),i j D∈  is 
receiving all required threshold commodities 
needed for operation 
[binary] 
Vnij Flow variable representing commodity flow 
from node n S∈  to support operation of arc 





Formulation of Defender Problem (INDIRECT-D) 
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This is a single-commodity minimum cost network flow model representing the 
defender’s problem for a collection of infrastructures with direct cost-based and indirect 
flow-based dependence relationships.  The objective function for INDIRECT-D is 
identical to DIRECT-D, as are Equations (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5).  The balance of flow 
equation (2.26) adds the dependence flow Vnij for parent nodes.  Equation (2.27) sets the 
dependence threshold variable Tnij for all system dependence relationships, and child arc 
flow upper bounds are set with constraint (2.28).  Demand node shortages are adjusted to 
allow for commodity flow between infrastructures at parent nodes (2.29).  Constraint 
(2.30) restricts the number of child arcs a parent node can support, while equation (2.31) 
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sets the child arc transfer variable based upon the required number of dependence links 
required for operation.  While Equation (2.9) explicitly shows the minimization is with 
regard to variables Y, T, W and V, we will subsequently write “ min
Y
“ for brevity with the 
understanding that we are also minimizing with respect to the T, W, and V variables (and 
EXCESS and SHORT) as well. 
3. Attacker Problem (INDIRECT-AD)  
We now consider an intelligent attacker solving for the worst case global 
interdiction possible with his attack resources. He can take advantage of direct cost-based 
and indirect commodity dependence relationships to maximize the global manager’s 
minimum cost.  We assume the attacker’s perfect knowledge extends to all dependence 
relationships, both direct and indirect. 




Formulation of Attacker Problem (INDIRECT-AD) 
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INDIRECT-AD represents the attacker’s problem for a single-commodity 
minimum cost network flow model of a collection of fully interdependent infrastructures.  
The objective function (2.32) expresses with respect to X the operating cost achievable 
with respect to commodity flow Y.  Constraints (2.26) thru (2.31) are identical to 
INDIRECT-D, Equation (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) with all prior models, and Equation (2.6) 
is consistent with prior AD formulations. 
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E. SOLVING INDIRECT-AD WITH DECOMPOSITION 
We solve INDIRECT-AD with Benders decomposition as follows.  Our 
subproblem is simply the defender’s problem, INDIRECT-D, for a fixed set of 
interdictions X .  Each such subproblem yields an optimal set of defender flows *Y  over 
the collection of infrastructure systems.  At each iteration m of our algorithm, we record 
this optimal set of flows as mY  (with associated values mnEXCESS and 
m
nSHORT ).  
Each of these solutions yields a bound on the total system cost Z, which the attacker can 
force the defender to pay: 
( )
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The collection of these bounds, in addition to any constraints on the interdictions 
themselves, yields the attacker’s master problem MASTER-AD. 
We summarize the Benders formulation of the master problem as follows. 
Indices and index sets 
m M⊆  Decomposition iteration counter [few] 
Data [units, if applicable] 
m
ijY  Optimal operator’s flow plan (solved in 
subproblem) for iteration m 
[commodity unit] 
m
nEXCESS  Excess commodity at node n for optimal 
operator plan in iteration m 
[commodity unit] 
m
nSHORT  Commodity shortage at node n for optimal 





Formulation of Attacker Problem (MASTER-AD) 
( )
max
( , ) ( , )







ij ijkl kl ij
r R i j A k l A
m mr
n nn n
r R n N
Z Y Z
subject to
Z h c q X Y





≤ +     
 






 The objective function (3.34) evaluates the attacker’s plan responding to the 
optimal operator’s commodity flow plan ( )Y .  Each subproblem solution (INDIRECT-
D) provides an additional constraint (3.33) for each iteration m. 
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The complete decomposition algorithm follows: 
Algorithm MASTER-AD 
Input:  infrastructure data, attacker resources, optimality tolerance 0ε ≥ . 
Output:  ε-optimal attack plan *X , responding operator plan *Y . 
1.    Initialize best lower bound LBZ ← −∞ , best upper bound UBZ ← +∞ , 
define the incumbent, null attack plan 1 0X ← as the best found so far, and 
set iteration counter 1M ← . 
2.    Subproblem:  use attacker plan MX  to solve INDIRECT-D and determine 
the optimal operator’s responding activity plan MY .  The bound on the 
associated objective is ( )min MZ X . 
3.    If 1M =  and 1X X∉  (i.e., not admissible), go to Step 6 (Master 
Problem). 
4.    If ( )min MLBZ Z X<  set ( )min MLBZ Z X←  and record improved incumbent 
attack plan * MX X← , and responding operator plan * MY Y← . 
5.    If UB LBZ Z ε− ≤  go to END. 
6.    Master Problem:  use operator plans MY  to solve MASTER-AD and 
determine an optimal attacker plan 1MX + .  The bound on the associated 
objective is ( )maxZ Y . 
7.    If ( )maxUBZ Z Y>  set ( )maxUBZ Z Y← . 
8.    If UB LBZ Z ε− ≤  go to END. 
9.    Set 1M M← +  and go to Step 2 (Subproblem). 





III. MODEL DEMONSTRATION 
With MASTER-AD fully defined, we clarify necessary concepts before 
introducing a small collection of infrastructures to demonstrate the model’s use. 
We make use of three separate decision-makers in these demonstrations.  An 
operator is the owner of an individual infrastructure within the collection, while the 
manager is the supervisor of the entire collection.  The operator maintains a local 
perspective of his infrastructure, while the manager has a global interest in the collection 
as a whole.  In keeping with the attacker-defender construct, the global manager is also 
referred to as the defender (attempting to minimize collection operation costs), and the 
attacker is the adversary attempting to maximize these same costs. 
In Chapter II, we introduced the concept of direct cost-based dependence through 
the use of qijkl, and we discussed the importance of carefully defining these costs to 
achieve desired model results that mirror reality.  For example, if an operator does not 
have the ability to send commodity flow past a failed electrical valve, our optimal model 
solution must not suggest flow across this valve if it is interdicted.  Conversely, if the 
operator has a backup battery for the electric valve, our model must allow for flow across 
the interdicted valve.  By setting qijkl carefully, we ensure our model reflects the desired 
behavior.  The following scenarios make use of each of these situations. 
Lastly, we define flow disruption as the case where there is zero commodity flow 
across a component, infrastructure, or collection (as indicated) due to interdiction.  Flow 
disruption across an infrastructure indicates commodity is no longer shipped from any 
supply nodes within that infrastructure due to attack, while flow disruption across the 
collection indicates the attacker has succeeded in stopping all flow within the collection 
of infrastructures. 
A. MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURES 
We first consider three independent infrastructures (denoted here as r1, r2, r3), 
each consisting of three nodes and three arcs, and each managed by an individual 
operator who attempts to satisfy supply and demand at minimum cost.  By construction, 
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during normal operation with no interdictions, the minimum-cost path for each 
infrastructure is a direct path between the supply and demand nodes, although one 
alternate (more expensive) path exists through a transshipment node as shown in Figure 
11.  For example, in infrastructure r2, there is a supply of 10 units at node r2n1 and a 
demand of 10 units at node r2n3.  The low-cost path (at $8 per unit of flow) is directly 
from r2n1 to r2n3.  There is a secondary path passing through node r2n2, but it costs a 
total of $10 per unit flow.  
 
Figure 11.   Multiple independent infrastructures during normal operation.   
Notation is shown in upper right.  Colored arcs indicate commodity flow, 
grey arcs have no flow.  Flow within each infrastructure is shown in a 
separate color with intensity representing arc capacity utilization as 
indicated in the legend.  During normal operation of the collection with no 
interdictions, commodity flow is direct from the supply to demand nodes in 
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1. Model Input 
Consider the case where all infrastructure costs are measured in dollars 
( )1,rh r R= ∀ ∈  and the global manager assesses the secondary effects and relative 
policy importance of each infrastructure to be the same ( )1,rp r R= ∀ ∈ .  In addition, 
assume that each infrastructure operator, recognizing the lack of robustness of a single 
supply and demand system, has hardened his supply and demand nodes, making them 
invulnerable to attack.  However, suppose that all arcs and transshipment nodes across 
the collection of infrastructures are vulnerable to attack.  Assume that each infrastructure 
has sufficient storage capability, so no penalties are charged for excess commodity 
availability, but penalties for shortages are assessed equally at $15 per unit of 
commodity.  In addition, assume that the per-unit cost to operate across interdicted arcs is 
$10 globally, while the cost to operate an interdicted node is set higher, at $25.  For our 
example, these costs are high enough to prevent shipment of commodity across 
interdicted components.  Also, no direct dependence relationships exist; interdicted arcs 
and nodes do not have a direct cost effect on any other arcs or nodes 





Table 1.   Model Input – multiple independent infrastructures. 
A “1” in the “Vuln” columns (Node Data and Arc Data sections) indicates 
the component is vulnerable to attack.  Each vulnerable component has an 
interdicted cost shown in the Interdiction Data section.  Blank entries are 
zero. 
2. Initial Results 








Γ = ≤     
∑ , an optimal attack plan is to disrupt the low-cost 
direct arc between the supply and demand nodes in an infrastructure.  Because the three 
infrastructures are identical, the attacker can select an infrastructure arbitrarily.  If the 
attacker can afford two attacks, the optimal attack plan is to disrupt both the arc between 
supply and demand nodes and the single transshipment node (the cost of operation on an 
interdicted node is greater than for an interdicted arc) within an infrastructure.  Because it 
costs less to suffer a shortage in an infrastructure than ship commodity across an 
interdicted arc or node, the worst two-component attack is one that results in total flow 
disruption across a single infrastructure, as shown in Figure 12.  By extension, the worst 
six-component attack is one that results in total flow disruption across the entire 
collection of infrastructures (not shown).   
r h r p r n Vuln b n ePen n sPen n i j Vuln c ij u ij i j k l q ijkl
r1 1 1 r1n1 10 0 r1n1 r1n2 1 5 20 r1n2 r1n2 r1n2 r1n2 25
r2 1 1 r1n2 1 r1n1 r1n3 1 8 20 r2n2 r2n2 r2n2 r2n2 25
r3 1 1 r1n3 -10 15 r1n2 r1n3 1 5 20 r3n2 r3n2 r3n2 r3n2 25
r2n1 10 0 r2n1 r2n2 1 5 20 r1n1 r1n2 r1n1 r1n2 10
r2n2 1 r2n1 r2n3 1 8 20 r1n1 r1n3 r1n1 r1n3 10
r2n3 -10 15 r2n2 r2n3 1 5 20 r1n2 r1n3 r1n2 r1n3 10
r3n1 10 0 r3n1 r3n2 1 5 20 r2n1 r2n2 r2n1 r2n2 10
r3n2 1 r3n1 r3n3 1 8 20 r2n1 r2n3 r2n1 r2n3 10
r3n3 -10 15 r3n2 r3n3 1 5 20 r2n2 r2n3 r2n2 r2n3 10
r3n1 r3n2 r3n1 r3n2 10
r3n1 r3n3 r3n1 r3n3 10
r3n2 r3n3 r3n2 r3n3 10
System Data Node Data Arc Data Interdiction Data (q ijkl )
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Figure 12.   Model Results for multiple independent infrastructures. 
Each panel shows the location of the optimal attacks and subsequent 
infrastructure operation.  The attack resources available are listed in the 
upper left corner and the resulting objective function value is boxed in the 
upper right corner.  A single attack resource allows an intelligent attacker to 
attack the low-cost path in any of the three infrastructures, requiring 
selection of the alternate, higher-cost path by the operator to flow 
commodity.  When attacking the alternate path, the attacker chooses to 
interdict the transshipment node because the cost for the defender to operate 
an interdicted node ($25) is higher than the cost to operate on an interdicted 
arc ($10).  Two attacks result in total flow disruption of a single 
infrastructure.  With all infrastructures identical and all cost conversion 
factors and policy weights equal to one, selection of the infrastructures for 
attack is arbitrary.  
 
The global manager’s operating cost for this collection of infrastructures increases 
as the attacker resources increase, until all flow across the global collection is disrupted 























Figure 13.   Effect of attack resources on a defender’s operating cost for a collection of 
independent infrastructures. 
All commodity flow across the collection of infrastructures is disrupted with 
six attacks, so no additional cost is incurred by the operator for further 
increases in attack resources.  Even with additional resources, the attacker 
does not benefit from more than six attacks. 
 
3. Effects of Cost Conversion Factors and Policy Weights 
Using the previous example as a “base case,” we demonstrate the use and effect 
of the cost conversion factors and policy weights.  Consider the case where the objective 
functions for the three individual infrastructures are measured in slightly different cost 
units, requiring cost conversions using hr.  In addition, assume that unmet demand 
between infrastructures results in secondary impacts on society, which are reflected in the 





















Attack Resources (# of attacks)
Effect of Attack Resources on Defender's Operating Cost
 53 
 
Table 2.   Modified Model Input – updated cost conversion factors (hr) and policy 
weights (pr) for multiple independent infrastructures. 
 
When considering the effects of hr and pr in isolation from each other, a 
disruption in the operation of r3 is most costly ( )3 2 1r r rh h h> >  while commodity 
shortages in r1 are most costly ( )1 2 3r r rp p p> > .  However, when considering both cost 
conversions and policy weights together, the results are not completely intuitive, as 
shown in Figure 14. 
  







Figure 14.   Model Results for updated cost conversions and policy weights for multiple 
independent infrastructures. 
Infrastructure r3 has highest cost factor, resulting in the minimum-cost path 
in r3 as the optimal single-attack.  Two attacks result in flow disruption in 
r2, even though r1 has the highest policy weight of all infrastructures.  The 
three-attack results illustrate the cost conversion factor and policy weight in 
infrastructure r1 result in optimally shipping commodity across an 
interdicted arc for an additional cost as opposed to suffering demand 
shortages.  Therefore, the attacker can no longer disrupt flow across the 
entire collection (only r2 and r3), and he gains no additional benefit with 
more than six attacks. 
 
This test case illustrates two important points.  First, pr1 is sufficiently large that 
the optimal plan for a global manager is to send commodity flow across an interdicted arc 
(at an additional cost) rather than taking a shortage penalty in r1.  Therefore, if an 
attacker can afford two attacks, his optimal plan is to disrupt flow in r2 rather than r1, as 
r2 has the second highest policy weight of the collection.  This demonstrates the attacker-
defender premise that the optimal attack plan assumes the subsequent operation by the 
global manager to be optimal.   
Secondly, in the absence of a global manager, the r1 operator makes myopic 
decisions that are locally optimal, but globally suboptimal.  If given no guidance from the 











 ship across an interdicted arc or node.  




















































commodity across an interdicted arc in r1 for optimal operation of the collection.  This 
case reinforces our assertion that a global manager, as opposed to individual 
infrastructure operators, is the only one who can set policy weights and drive decisions 
required for the overall good of the infrastructures.   
B. COLLECTION OF INFRASTRUCTURES WITH CO-LOCATED 
COMPONENT 
We now consider direct dependence relationships and their impact on attacker and 
defender decisions when analyzing a collection of infrastructures.  As the Howard Street 
Tunnel accident in Baltimore illustrated, the co-location of components can have severe 
consequences when disruptions occur.  Adding a co-location dependence relationship to a 
collection of infrastructures can introduce a new way for an attacker to indirectly 
influence the system. 
We return to the base case defined previously with equal cost and policy weights 
(all set to one).  However, we now additionally consider a single direct dependence, 
defined by two arcs that are geographically co-located, so an attack on either arc is an 
interdiction of both (Figure 15).  This dependence results in the addition of two 
interdiction costs as additional model input (Table 3). 
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Figure 15.   Direct Dependence.  Three identical infrastructures shown during normal 
operation.   
Arcs (r1n2, r1n3) and (r2n2, r2n3) are geographically co-located; therefore, 
an attack on either results in an interdiction cost on both. 
 
 
Table 3.   Model Input – direct dependence. 
System Data now reflects cost conversion factors and policy weights that are 
all equal to one, while Interdiction Data shows additional interdiction costs 
(qijkl) for co-located components.  For example, an interdiction of (r1n2, 
r1n3) now results in an interdiction cost of $10 per unit of commodity flow 
on (r2n2, r2n3) and vice versa.  All other input data (node, arc and 
































r h r p r i j k l q ijkl
r1 1 1 r1n2 r1n3 r2n2 r2n3 10
r2 1 1 r2n2 r2n3 r1n2 r1n3 10
r3 1 1
System Data Interdiction Data
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 The addition of the direct dependence to the model has the effect of giving 
the attacker an additional resource, because with a single attack on either (r1n2, r1n3) or 
(r2n2, r2n3) he gets the benefit of interdicting both arcs.  In the base case, an attacker 
could disrupt all flow across any infrastructure with two attacks and disrupt flow across 
the entire collection with six attacks.  However, due to the direct dependence, the attacker 
can now disrupt all flow in r1 and r2 with only three attacks, and disrupt flow across the 
entire collection of infrastructures with five attacks (Figure 16).   
 
Figure 16.   Model Results for a direct dependence between two arcs in separate 
infrastructures. 
An attack on either one interdicts both arcs, effectively disrupting two 
infrastructures with three attacks (vice four in the base case), and enabling 
total flow disruption across the collection with five attacks (vice six). 
 
The increases in operating costs for the defender in the presence of attack are 
shown in Figure 17.  In this simple scenario, if the attacker possesses the ability to attack 
three or more components, the direct dependence results in a cost increase of 5%–15% 
for the defender.  In addition, the attacker can disrupt all flow across the collection with 
only 5/6 of his original attack resources when compared to the base case.  In the presence 
of direct dependence relationships, treating infrastructures in isolation or as a collection 




























Figure 17.   Operating Costs versus Attack Resources. 
Comparison of a base case of independent infrastructures against a scenario 
with a single direct dependence between a pair of arcs in separate 
infrastructures.  The dependence creates higher costs for the defender (15% 
for 3 attacks) and results in total disruption of the collection of 
infrastructures with fewer attacks (5 versus 6) through the introduction of a 
vulnerability. 
 
C. INTERDEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURES 
We now present a different base case for comparing the impact of interdependent 
infrastructures.  Again, consider three independent infrastructures (denoted here as r1, r2, 
r3), each consisting of three nodes and three arcs and each managed by an individual 
operator who attempts to satisfy supply and demand at minimum cost.  By construction, 
during normal operation with no interdictions, the low-cost path for each infrastructure 
now flows through the transshipment node (at a cost of $10 per unit flow), and the direct 
path from the supply to demand node is more expensive ($11 per unit flow).   This 
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Figure 18.   Multiple independent infrastructures during normal operation, serving as a 
base case for indirect dependence model. 
 
1. Model Input 
Consider a case where all infrastructure costs are in dollars ( )1,rh r R= ∀ ∈  and a 
global manager weights policy costs equally ( )1,rp r R= ∀ ∈ .  All supply and demand 
nodes are invulnerable to attack; however, we assume that all arcs and transshipment 
nodes across the collection of infrastructures are vulnerable to attack.  We also assume 
that each infrastructure has sufficient storage capability, so no penalties are charged for 
excess commodity, but penalty costs for demand shortages ($50/unit flow) are set to 
encourage commodity flow across interdicted arcs.    The per-unit cost to operate across 
an interdicted arc is $10 for an arc originating or terminating at a transshipment node and 
$20 for any arc direct between supply and demand nodes (i.e., r1n1, r1n3).  The cost to 































exists; interdicted arcs and nodes do not have a direct cost effect on any other arcs or 
nodes ( ) ( )0, , ,ijklq i j k l = ∀ ≠  .  The model input is tabulated in Table 4.  
 
Table 4.   Model Input – Multiple independent infrastructures serving as base case for 
indirect dependence scenario. 
 
2. Initial Results 
During normal operation of this collection of infrastructures, the optimal 
commodity flow is across the transshipment node in each infrastructure.  Therefore, if the 
attacker can afford only a single attack, the optimal attack plan is to disrupt the 
transshipment nodes first (cost of operation on an interdicted node is greater than for an 
interdicted arc).  Because the three infrastructures are identical, attacker selection of an 
infrastructure is arbitrary.  If he can afford two attacks, the optimal attack plan involves 
interdiction of both the arc between the supply and demand nodes and the transshipment 
node within a single infrastructure, and the resulting optimal commodity shipment 
involves flow across the interdicted arc in order to satisfy demand.  Maximum cost to the 
defender results from six attacks, and the attacker does not benefit from further resource 
increases.  Figure 19 highlights the results of this base case. 
r h r p r n Vuln b n ePen n sPen n i j Vuln c ij u ij i j k l q ijkl
r1 1 1 r1n1 20 0 r1n1 r1n2 1 5 30 r1n2 r1n2 r1n2 r1n2 25
r2 1 1 r1n2 1 r1n1 r1n3 1 11 30 r2n2 r2n2 r2n2 r2n2 25
r3 1 1 r1n3 -10 50 r1n2 r1n3 1 5 30 r3n2 r3n2 r3n2 r3n2 25
r2n1 15 0 r2n1 r2n2 1 5 20 r1n1 r1n2 r1n1 r1n2 10
r2n2 1 r2n1 r2n3 1 11 20 r1n1 r1n3 r1n1 r1n3 20
r2n3 -10 50 r2n2 r2n3 1 5 20 r1n2 r1n3 r1n2 r1n3 10
r3n1 10 0 r3n1 r3n2 1 5 15 r2n1 r2n2 r2n1 r2n2 10
r3n2 1 r3n1 r3n3 1 11 15 r2n1 r2n3 r2n1 r2n3 20
r3n3 -10 50 r3n2 r3n3 1 5 15 r2n2 r2n3 r2n2 r2n3 10
r3n1 r3n2 r3n1 r3n2 10
r3n1 r3n3 r3n1 r3n3 20
r3n2 r3n3 r3n2 r3n3 10




Figure 19.   Model Results for multiple independent infrastructures. 
The minimum-cost path in each infrastructure is through a transshipment 
node.  The optimal single attack targets a transshipment node, requiring 
selection of the alternate, higher-cost path by the operator.  For two attacks, 
both paths in any infrastructure are interdicted.  With all infrastructures 
identical (including cost conversion factors and policy weights), 
infrastructure selection for attack is arbitrary.  As it is cheaper to operate on 
the interdicted arc ($20/unit flow) than to operate interdicted nodes 
($25/unit flow) or suffer a commodity shortage ($50/unit flow), the optimal 
flow plan requires shipment across the interdicted arc between the supply 
and demand nodes.  The attacker cannot improve with more than six attacks, 















































3. Indirect Dependence 
Consider the case where there are two dependence relationships in this collection 
of infrastructures.   
First, suppose that there is a shared dependence between the parent node r1n3 and 
two child arcs (r2n2, r2n3) and (r3n1, r3n2).  Node r1n3 is capable of supporting both 
child arcs simultaneously (max_supportabler1n3=2), and each child arc requires five 
commodity units to operate (threshold[r1n3,(r2n2,r2n3)]=threshold[r1n3,(r3n1,r3n2)]=5).  While 
child arc (r2n2, r2n3) requires commodity from only the single parent node 
(min_required(r2n2,r2n3)=1), a complimentary dependence exists between child arc (r3n1, 
r3n2) and parent nodes r1n3 and r2n3.  In this case, child arc (r3n1, r3n2) requires five 
commodity units from both parent nodes to operate (min_required(r3n1, r3n2)=2).  Table 5 
shows the additional model input while Figure 20 displays the resulting collection of 
infrastructures. 
 
Table 5.   Model Input –indirect dependence.   
Dependence data to support the shared and complementary dependence 
relationships.  System, Node, Arc and Interdiction Data remains as in Table 
4. 
n i j max_supportable n min_required ij threshold nij
r1n3 r2n2 r2n3 2 1 5
r1n3 r3n1 r3n2 2 2 5




Figure 20.   Indirect Dependence.   
Collection of infrastructures from the base case with a shared and 
complimentary dependence added.  Each dependence arc is labeled with 
max_supportablen, min_requiredij, and thresholdnij, and terminates at a black 
bar beside the recipient child arc.  The optimal flow plan with no 
interdictions does not use child arcs (r2n3,r2n3) and (r3n1, r3n2) due to the 
additional flow costs required in the parent node infrastructures (r1 and r2) 
to support these child arcs.  This globally optimal solution differs from the 
local optimal solution for both r2 and r3, which would require flow 
commodity through the transshipment nodes. 
 
The presence of indirect dependence relationships in this collection changes the 
optimal actions of both the attacker and defender, as shown in Figure 21.  As a result, 
examination of the optimal attack plans uncover two attacker priorities: interdicting paths 
that do not contain child arcs in supported infrastructures (r2 or r3), and when resources 






































Figure 21.   Model Results for indirect dependence. 
With indirect dependence relationships, the minimum-cost paths through r2 
and r3 are direct from the supply to demand node, to avoid costs associated 
with using child arcs.  The optimal single attack targets arc (r3n1, r3n3), 
resulting in use of the most costly dependence; in this case, the 
complimentary relationship from parent nodes r1n3 and r2n3 to child arc 
(r3n1, r3n2).  For two attacks, both paths in r1 are interdicted, as the parent 
node in this infrastructure (r1n3) potentially supports two separate child 
arcs, (r2n2, r2n3) and (r3n1, r3n2).  The defender’s optimal response does 
not make use of either child arc requiring dependence flow.  With three 
attacks, the optimal plan is to interdict both paths in r1 along with an attack 
on (r3n1, r3n3) to force use of the complimentary dependence.  A fourth 
attack is placed in r2 to force use of the shared dependence.  Five attacks 
result in shipment across interdicted arcs in all infrastructures with no active 
dependence relationships. We note that the use of dependence arcs between 
infrastructures, and the resulting commodity flow and objective function 
values change significantly with level of attack resources. 
 
For this example, the interdiction of a path that does not contain a child arc in a 
supported infrastructure results in either subsequent shipment across the interdicted arc or 
commodity flow across the child arc.  Because the latter requires use of a supporting 
dependence relationship, either option leads to an increased cost to the defender.  For 
example, if the attacker can afford only one attack, the optimal attack is against arc (r3n1, 






























































the complementary dependence, resulting in additional commodity flow costs in both r1 
and r2 to support the additional demand on the parent nodes r1n3 and r2n3.   
Attacks on parent node infrastructures (r1 and r2) further increase the cost to a 
defender.  Consider the situation where the attacker can afford two attacks. The optimal 
attacker plan is to interdict both paths in r1, because the parent node r1n3 supports two 
separate dependence relationships.  Therefore, r1 has the highest commodity flow 
potential and is the optimal infrastructure of the three to interdict.  
An intelligent attacker needs no more than five attacks, when he has interdicted 
both paths in the supporting infrastructures (r1 and r2) and also interdicted the single arc 
in r3 that does not require use of dependence relationships.  Any additional increase in 
attack resources results in identical defender flow response.  The cost to the global 
manager to operate his collection of infrastructures is higher for every level of 
interdiction than it is without consideration of indirect dependence relationships, as 




Figure 22.   Operating Costs versus Attack Resources. 
Comparison of a base case of independent infrastructures against a scenario 
with two indirect dependence relationships.  The dependence results in total 
disruption of the collection of infrastructures with 20% fewer attack 
resources (five versus six attacks).  On average, the global manager’s 
operating cost increases 23% over the base case with no indirect 
dependence, and peaks at 43% for the three-attack scenario. 
 
Using examples like this to examine infrastructure interdependence, we see that 
with only a small number of interdependent relationships, the minimum-cost operation 
and worst-case disruptions of infrastructures can become non-intuitive.  While there are 
many more relationships that could be presented, our intent here is to provide simple 
convincing illustrations, rather than provide an exhaustive collection of examples.  We 
show that adding interdependence relationships creates opportunities for (but does not 
guarantee) new vulnerabilities.  Conversely, finding alternate means of satisfying certain 
dependence relationships (e.g., substitute dependence) might reduce vulnerabilities in a 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We conclude by summarizing our work and proposing several ideas for future 
research on this topic. 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis extends the application of attacker-defender models from single to 
multiple, interdependent infrastructures.  We present a general formulation for assessing 
resilience of a collection of independent infrastructures.  We define a direct, cost-based 
dependence and introduce a model to examine such relationships (e.g., geographic 
dependence).  Finally, we define six indirect component-level dependence relationships:  
single-input, exclusive-or, shared, substitute, complimentary and mutual; and present a 
final formulation to assess the resilience of a collection of infrastructures containing both 
direct and indirect dependence relationships.  We present an algorithm based on Benders 
decomposition to solve this formulation in an efficient manner. 
We solve a sequence of simple network flow models and present the worst-case 
attacks and resulting operator flows for different levels of attacker resources.  As our 
demonstrations show, the assumption that supporting infrastructures are available and 
invulnerable to attack (as most researchers modeling infrastructures in isolation have 
done to date) can lead to inaccurate, unjustifiably optimistic assessments of network 
resilience and can provide operators with a false sense of security.  Disruptions can be 
more costly when infrastructures are interdependent, and the presence of these 
dependence relationships favors the attacker.  We show that locally optimal decisions of a 
single operator do not always lead to globally optimal behavior within a collection of 
interdependent infrastructures, necessitating the need for a global decision maker to 
coordinate such activities at the level of the entire collection of infrastructures. 
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B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Regional Case Study 
A natural next step is to apply the techniques in this thesis to a regional case 
study.  Demonstrating the formulation’s viability using real-world infrastructures would 
serve to highlight the extent to which direct and indirect dependence relationships are 
present within our nation’s critical infrastructures.  It would also highlight the 
vulnerabilities we ignore when modeling infrastructures in isolation. 
2. Model Refinements 
This thesis made several simplifying assumptions that are not realistic and might 
need to be relaxed in practice.  First, our model does not allow for attacks on indirect 
dependence arcs between infrastructures.  Real-world dependence relationships can be 
vulnerable to attack, and understanding the implications on system resilience is a topic 
for future research.  In addition, we assume for illustrative purposes that an attack on an 
activity always results in a single, maximum increased cost for a defender to conduct an 
activity post-interdiction.  It may prove advantageous to model levels of attack severity, 
with the attacker able to choose both the components to interdict and the severity of the 
attack.  Attacker resources can then be defined in terms of a budget, with costs assigned 
to attack a particular activity at a given level of severity.  Each of these model 
refinements can be made without increasing model complexity. 
3. Independent Infrastructure Modeling Techniques 
We formulated and solved each example in this thesis as a monolithic model.  
However, our formulation is separable by design, so that if the linking variables (T, V and 
W) are fixed, each of the individual infrastructures in the collection can be solved 
independently, as often happens in the real world.  This separation of infrastructures will 
require more complicated solution techniques.  While the master problem (attacker’s 
problem) will remain the same, the defender’s problem that serves as the subproblem 
(INDIRECT-AD) will require decomposition to solve.  This subproblem will consist of a 
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global manager’s master problem, containing the dependence relationships between 
infrastructures, and operator subproblems for each individual infrastructure. 
4. Additional Dependence Relationships 
Although we use minimum-cost network flow models in this thesis for ease of 
illustration, our main contribution is independent of the particular models used to 
represent the individual infrastructures.  A natural extension of our formulation would be 
to consider dependence beyond the pure physical relationships defined in this work and 
cover other dependence classes, such as logical or cyber.  A challenge in that domain is 
how to formulate operator activity ( )Y ∈Ψ  and attacker resource ( )X ∈Γ  constraints 
for each infrastructure within the collection. 
5. Extension to Tri-level Defender-Attacker-Defender Models 
Other researchers have demonstrated the value of both bi-level and tri-level 
models for worst-case analysis of infrastructures in isolation (Brown et al. 2006, 2008; 
Alderson et al. 2011).  A natural extension of this thesis work is the implementation of a 
tri-level model to identify an optimal defensive plan for the collection of infrastructures.  
Much like the extension to separable infrastructures, the addition of the third level, the 
defender’s preparation problem, is not a trivial matter and will create new computational 
complexities. 
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Accidents such as the train derailment in Baltimore’s Howard Street Tunnel and 
terrorist attacks such as 9/11 have served to highlight the interdependencies present 
among our nation’s critical infrastructures, as well as the negative impacts that can result.  
We provide our formulations as a means of representing these dependence relationships 
in operational-level, game-theoretic models to uncover resulting vulnerabilities and more 
accurately assess resilience for collections of infrastructures. 
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